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7 Adams and Balfour (2004) offer a nuanced analysis of the role of orders in their theory of "administrative evil." Where Milgram focused on dyads of order givers and order takers, Adams and Balfour focus on the multiple levels of authority that exist in the military and other large bureaucracies. As decisions are shared by numerous individuals, a decision can be made to carry out torture or killing without any one individual feeling morally responsible. In a later article, Adams, Balfour, and Reed (2006) applied the theory of administrative evil to Abu Ghraib. They argued that the overlapping and confused nature of authority at the prison, and the lack of clarity in rules regulating the treatment of prisoners, explains why torture occurred.
Political systems and democracy: Scholars agree that non-democratic states are more likely than democratic ones to engage in torture, but disagree on how democratic institutions prevent torture and how effective they are in doing so. Political scientists have found a correlation between liberal democratic systems and respect for human rights in general (Howard and Donnelly 1986; Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Henderson 1991) , and a correlation between democracy and respect for personal integrity rights in particular (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999) . However, while liberal democratic institutions seem to protect against torture, they do not prevent torture from ever occurring (Einolf 2007) . Scholars have documented the use of torture against criminal suspects in the United States (Conroy 2000) , on rebellious colonial subjects in British-occupied Kenya (Anderson 2005; Elkins 2005 ) and French-occupied Algeria (Maran 1989; Vidal-Naquet 1963) , and against terrorist and revolutionary movements in Ireland (Conroy 2000) and Israel (Ron 1997).
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In summary, current scholarship on torture agrees that social environments, not flaws in individual psychology, explain torture. Training and orders play some role in causing torture, but may not be absolutely necessary for torture to occur. Liberal democratic states rarely torture their own citizens for political reasons, but do sometimes use torture on criminal suspects, colonial subjects, and suspected terrorists.
The scholarly disagreement over the causes of torture has a parallel in media and political debates over Abu Ghraib. Journalists, popular commentators, and politicians have disagreed on whether the torturers at Abu Ghraib had been trained to commit torture, and whether they acted on the orders or encouragement of superiors. They have also expressed shock and confusion that the United States, a liberal democracy with a tradition of valuing human rights, could be responsible for torture. The rest of this essay assesses how well each of these four books answers these questions.
Stjepan Mestrovic, The Trials of Abu Ghraib:
Stjepan Mestrovic is a clinical psychologist and sociologist, who served as an expert witness in the trials of several of the Abu Ghraib defendants. In both the courtroom and his book, Mestrovic argued that the social setting, not the criminal impulses of the defendants, was the main reason torture occurred. Mestrovic proposes no new causal theories of violence, but relies upon existing social psychological research to make his case.
Mestrovic successfully demonstrates that the terrible social setting of Abu Ghraib caused the tortures there. His detailed account of the stressful, dangerous, and chaotic environment of the prison will lead even the most unsympathetic readers to feel some Zimbardo examines how training and authority caused torture to occur at Abu Ghraib. While the guards were not given direct orders to commit torture, the military interrogators encouraged them to do so by asking them to "set the conditions" for successful interrogation. When the guards used torture methods, interrogators praised them, commenting that the prisoners were much more compliant during interrogation sessions after the late-night sessions of prisoner abuse. While the guards were not given formal instruction in methods, they did learn torture methods informally from visitors who had used these methods in Guantanamo. The Guantanamo interrogators in turn had adapted their methods from the armed forces' Survival, Evasion, and Resistance (SERE) program, a program that submits officers to physical and psychological abuse in order to prepare them to resist torture if captured. Just as the students in the Stanford Prison Experiment drew upon their knowledge of fraternity initiations and school punishments, the interrogators at Guantanamo drew upon experiences from the SERE program in innovating methods of torture. The Abu Ghraib torturers learned methods from visitors from Guantanamo, and probably also from CIA interrogators. They then improvised improvements on these method on their own.
In a concluding chapter, Zimbardo praises the heroism of those who resisted abusive situations, particularly Christina Maslach, the graduate student who convinced Zimbardo to end the Stanford Prison Experiment, and Joe Darby, the soldier who blew the whistle at Abu Ghraib by giving copies of the torture photos to superiors outside the chain of command. One of Zimbardo's solutions to torture is to encourage individuals to resist evil group influences. He outlines a "ten-step program" for readers, with 
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will probably lead to a complete ban on torture after the current administration leaves office. By studying the social settings that cause torture, and the institutions that help prevent it, social scientists can design systems to prevent torture from occurring. As the political environment in the United States and elsewhere changes, social scientists will likely have more opportunities to put these recommendations into effect.
